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COMMENT
TORTS-LIBEL IN NEW MEXICOREED v. MELNICK
This comment will examine the recent New Mexico Supreme Court
decision of Reed v. Melnick, in which the court adopted new rules
concerning libel in New Mexico. A discussionof the historicaltreatment of defamation will enable the readerto familiarize himself with
certain terms analogous to the study of libeL
I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND TREATMENT OF DEFAMATION

The wrong of defamation is sometimes a crime, 1 sometimes a tort,
and sometimes can be treated either as a crime or a tort at the choice
of the injured party.2 The rules of defamation vary-depending on
the treatment as a crime or a tort, and depending on the manner of
publication, be it by word of mouth (slander) or by means of a
writing (libel). How and why the distinctions between libel and
slander arose are not entirely clear. The distinctions seem not to rest
upon any sound or fundamental basis, but apparently upon an
anomolous historical development. 3
In the middle ages, the only remedy available for defamation was
in the ecclesiastical courts. Later, in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, the common law courts began to compete in this field of
jurisdiction, and soon deprived the ecclesiastical courts of most of
their power. At the same time, the star chamber assumed jurisdiction
over all matters concerning the press, and the criminal process of
libel arose. When the star chamber was abolished, the law of defamation thus consisted of two very divergent parts. 4 To a great extent,
those distinctions' exist today.
As the common law developed, any publication in the form of
libel was actionable if, in fact, it defamed the plaintiff, regardless of
1. See N.M. Stat. Ann. 40A-11-1 (Repl. 1964).
2. Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 40 L.Q. Rev.
302 (1924).
3. Carpenter, Libel Per Se in California and Some Other States, 17 So. Cal. L. Rev. 347
(1944).
4. Holdsworth, supra note 2, at 305.
5. See 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law 346-54 (4th ed. 1926), and Plunknett, A
Concise History of the Common Law 427-45 (2d ed. 1926). See also Thorley v. Kerry, 4
Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (1812), in which Sir James Mansfield, Chief Justice of the
Court of Common Pleas, decried the wisdom of continuing those distinctions, but authored
the very decision which has been said to have vastly reinforced those same distinctions.
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whether the words appeared defamatory on their face or whether
they caused special damages.6
Slander, on the other hand, was divided into two categories:
slander per se, and slander per quod. Slander was actionable without
7
proof of special damages only if it fell into the per se category. The
per se category included only three classes of defamation where there
were imputations of: (1) a crime; (2) a loathsome disease; and (3)
conduct or characteristics incompatable with the plaintiff's trade or
profession. A fourth category' (that of the imputation of unchastity
to women) was sometimes added in more recent decisions. Slander
9
per se was actionable without allegations of special damages regardless of whether the defamatory character appeared on the face of the
statement' 0 or was latent and required a showing of extrinsic' 1
matter to make it appear derogatory. 2 Any slander not falling into
one or more of the per se categories was known as slander per quod.
Slander per quod was actionable only upon allegation and proof of
special damages.' '
Thus, at common law and in England today, only slander was
broken down into the per se-per quod categories.' 4 Any publication in the form of libel was actionable without proof of special
damages.'
II
DEFAMATION IN NEW MEXICO

New Mexico decisions dealing with defamation have gradually
6. See Carpenter, supra note 3, at 347; see also Prosser, Torts, 780-83 (3rd ed. 1964).
7. Sometimes known as slander actionable per se. See Gatly, Libel and Slander 47 (5th
ed. 1970).
8. See Prosser, supra note 6, at 772-78 for an extensive outline of all slander actionable
without proof of special damages; see also Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 Va. L. Rev. 839-40
(1960).
9. Restatement of Torts § 574, at 183, 84 (1938); Prosser, supra note 6, at 772, see also
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 574 (1966).
10. Known as patent defamation.
11. In a defamation action, the inducement supplies allegations of fact extrinsic to the
published matter itself. The inducement's principle function is to supply extrinsic facts
which render material non-defamatory on its face capable of having a defamatory meaning.
Henn, Libel-by-Extrinsic-Fact,47 Cornell L.Rev. 14-19 (1961).
12. That part of the declaration which explains the meaning of the published matter,
either by itself, or with the extrinsic facts alleged in the inducement is known as the
innuendo. Henn, id, at 20.
13. See Prosser, supra note 6, § 107, at 778.
14. See Wade, Defamation, 66 L.Q. Rev. 348, 349 (1950); also Youssoupoff v. Metro
Goldwin-Mayer Pictures, 50 T.L.R. 581, 99 A.L.R. 864 (1934).
15. Harper, A Treatise on the Law of Torts § 243 (1933).
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strayed from the common law principles.' In Dillardv. Shattuck, I "
a slander case decided in 1932, the Supreme Court of New Mexico
held: (1) that in determining whether alleged defamatory words are
slanderous per se, any innuendo is to be disregarded;' 8 (2) that
language claimed to be actionable will receive an innocent interpretation when fairly susceptable of it and that words will be construed
in a defamatory sense only if that is their plain and obvious meaning;' 9 (3) that the language claimed as slanderous must be construed
as a stranger might look at it without the aid of any knowledge
possessed by the parties concerned; 2" and (4) that oral defamation is
to be more strictly construed than libel.
Until Chase v. New Mexico PublishingCo. 1 (1949), New Mexico
had followed orthodox rules of libel. 2 2 Prior to Chase, libel per se
meant all libel, be it patent or latent.2 3 In Chase, the New Mexico
Supreme Court defined libel per se to mean patent defamation (i.e.,
where the defamatory impact was formed by the words alone, without recourse to extrinsic matter or innuendo). All other libel was
classified as libel per quod. Thus, if the libel was not patent, allegation and proof of special damages was to be required.
Three years later, in Del Rico Co. v. New Mexican, Inc.,2 4 the
innocent meaning rule 2 1 was adopted for cases involving libel. In Del
Rico, the court also set strict guidelines on the sufficiency of general
26
allegations of special damages.
16. See Comment, Torts-Libel and Slander-The Libel Per Se-Libel Per Quod Distinction in New Mexico, 4 Natural Resources J. 590 (1965), for a review of the development of
the rules of libel in New Mexico.
17. 36 N.M. 202, 11 P.2d 543 (1932).
18. This was contra to the existing New Mexico law as well as to the common law
treatment of libel.
19. This innocent meaning rule was first applied to libel in Del Rico Co. v. New Mexican,
Inc., 56 N.M. 538, 246 P.2d 206 (1952), and was later cited in McGaw v. Webster, 79 N.M.
104, 440 P.2d 296 (1968); Thomas v. Frost, 79 N.M. 125, 440 P.2d 800 (Ct. App. 1968);
and in Reed v. Melnick, 81 N.M. 608, 471 P.2d 178 (1970).
20. It is a small consolation for a plaintiff who has been shunned by his friends to learn
that he has not been defamed in the eyes of strangers. Comment, Libel Per Se and Special
Damages, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 730, 743 (1960).
21. 53 N.M. 145, 203 P.2d 594 (1949).
22. Comment, supra note 16, at 598.
23. Id.
24. Del Rico Co. v. New Mexican, Inc., 56 N.M. 538, 246 P.2d 206 (1952).
25. As first set forth in the slander action of Dillard v. Shattuck, 36 N.M. 202, 11 P.2d
543 (1932).
26. Quoting Newell, Slander and Libel 841-44, (4th ed. 1924), the court stated:
An allegation stating generally that in consequence of the defendant's words
the plaintiff has lost a large sum of money, or that his practice or business has
declined, is not sufficiently precise where the words are not actionable per se.
The names of the persons who have ceased to employ the plaintiff, or would
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Thus, after the Chase and Del Rico decisions, a plaintiff who
27
wished to have alleged defamatory writings labeled libelous per se,
faced the task of convincing the court 2 8 that the words could not be
interpreted in any innocent manner whatsoever, and that the alleged
29
defamatory words were libelous on their face without reverence to
any innuendo or extrinsic matter. If the plaintiff failed to convince
the judge that the words were libelous per se, specific allegations of
special damages were required to be stated and proven-a task so
difficult, that since the formulation of the rules outlined in Chase
(1949) and Del Rico (1952), not one appellate case can be found in
New Mexico where a plaintiff has won a suit in which the words have
been labeled libel per quod.
Cognizant of the question of the validity of the libel per se-per
quod distinction, the dissenting Justices Moise and Carmody noted in
McGaw v. Webster,3" that a re-examination of the distinction should
be made. In Thomas v. Frost,3 ' the Court of Appeals considered the
plaintiff's contention that the libel per se-per quod distinction be
re-examined, but refused to do so due to the recentness (three
weeks) of the McGaw decision. A year and one half later, the question was again raised. 3 2 This time a revision of the rules of libel was
to come.
III

REED v. MELNICK

ter

The Reed v. Melnick dispute arose over an allegedly libelous let3 sent by defendant Melnick to the Hartford Fire Insurance

have commenced to deal with him had not the defendant dissuaded them,
should be set out in the statement, and they themselves called as witnesses at
the trial to state their reason for not dealing with the plaintiff.
27. Actionable without proof of special damages. See Chase v. New Mexico Publishing
Co., 53 N.M. 145, 203 P.2d 594 (1949).
28. Though apparently not mentioned in a New Mexico decision, it has traditionally
been accepted as a matter of law whether a statement is capable of a defamatory meaning.
See Restatement of Torts, § 614 (1938).
29. Defined in Chase v. New Mexico Publishing Co., 53 N.M. 148, 203 P.2d 595, as
"[a] ny false and malicious writing published of another is libelous per se, when its tendency
is to render him (the plaintiff) contemptible or ridiculous in public estimation, or expose
him to public hatred or contempt, or to hinder virtuous men from associating with him."
30. 79 N.M. 104, 108, 440 P.2d 296, 301 (1968).
31. 79 N.M. 125, 128, 440 P.2d 800, 803 (Ct. App. 1968).
32. In Reed v. Melnick, 81 N.M. 14, 462 P.2d 148 (Ct. App. 1969).
33. Id., at 15. The text of the letter read:
Please cancel the attached PN 46 HO 210678 for insureds Earl R. Buss and
Lillian Buss. They have sold the property and wish refund. Please send refund
to this office as we must finish disbursements of the closing.
Cancellation should be effective 12-8-67, date of sale. We have just received
the original policy back from the lienholder. Under no circumstances send the
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Company, for whom plaintiff was then agent. Plaintiff brought suit
in the district court of Los Alamos County, contending that the
letter contained matter defamatory and of a prejudicial nature
against the plaintiff in relation to his business and that the letter was
defamatory on its face without resort to innuendo or inducement.
Plaintiff did not allege special damages in his complaint.
Defendant Melnick contended the words were not libelous on
their face, 3 4 were not susceptable of a single and defamatory meaning,3 5 and did not subject the plaintiff to public ridicule, hatred, or
contempt. 3 6 Arguing the words were not libelous per se, defendant
asked for dismissal because no special damages were alleged by plaintiff.
On motion by defendant, the District Judge dismissed the action
for failure to state a claim, 3 finding that the allegedly defamatory
letter was not libelous per se, and in absence of an allegation of
special damages, the complaint was insufficient.
On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed. The deci3 8
sion by the Court of Appeals was based on conventional grounds;
finding that the language of the letter contained matter defamatory
and of a prejudicial nature to Reed in relation to his business, 3 and
that it did so without resort to innuendo. 4 0 Judge Oman (dissenting)' 'was unable to agree with the majority opinion because of his
understanding of the meaning of libel per se as set forth in the
decisions of the Supreme Court of New Mexico. Also, Judge Oman
urged the New Mexico Supreme Court to re-examine the validity of
the libel per se-per quod distinction.
Defendant Melnick then petitioned the New Mexico Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari. Noting the previous suggestions for a
refund to F.L.W. Reed (agent of record) as in this community people cannot
get money out of him.
I don't even want to rely on getting his return commission back from him as
he is threatening backruptcy [sic] and my client wants his full refund since he
no longer owns property.
34. Under the rules formulated in Dillard and Chase, if the defamatory words were not
libelous on their face, the defamation was classified as libel per quod, and special damages
were required.
35. The innocent meaning rule, as adopted in Diliard and Chase.
36. See Chase, 53 N.M. 145, 148, 203 P.2d 594, 595 (1949).
37. Pursuant to N.M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) [N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(12)(b)(6) (Supp.
1967)].
38. The court did not ostensibly disregard or reconsider the rules of defamation set forth
in previous New Mexico decisions, but based its decision on language cited from Chase,
Dillard, Thomas v. Frost, and Ramsey v. Ziegner, 79 N.M. 457, 444 P.2d 968 (1968).
39. 81 N.M. 14, 16,462 P.2d 148, 150 (1970).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 16, 462 P.2d at 150-51 (1970).
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re-examination of the libel per se-per quod distinction, 4 2 and because it felt "the matter involved a substantial amount of public
interest, ' 4 1 the New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari. On
certiorari, held-new rules concerning libel were laid out and the case
was remanded for trial.
IV
HOLDINGS IN REED v. MELNICK
The New Mexico Supreme Court abandoned the rules strictly requiring proof of special damages in all libel actions where the defamatory words were not libelous on their face. 4 4 Adopted was
§ 569 of the Restatement of Torts (1938), together with the amend45
ment passed at the 1966 meeting of the American Law Institute:
One who falsely and without a privilege to do so published matter
defamatory to another in such manner as to make the publication a
libel, is liable to the other although no special harm or loss of reputation results therefrom; provided, however, that where the defamatory character of the writing can only be shown by reference to
extrinsic facts the plaintiff must plead and prove either: (1) that the
publisher knew or should have known of the extrinsic facts which
were necessary to make the statement defamatory in its innuendo;
or (2) special damages. 4 6
The Supreme Court also quoted Wisconsin authority in Martin v.
Outboard Marine Corp.4 7 which dealt with the Wisconsin treatment
of defamation which could be interpreted in either a defamatory or a
non-defamatory sense. 4 8 The New Mexico court then agreed with
Wisconsin, and reaffirmed the New Mexico innocent meaning rule. 4 9

V
THE AMENDED § 569 OF THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
To predict the effects of the amended § 569 of the Restatement
of Torts, 6are must be taken to analyze the reasoning behind its
adoption-both by the American Law Institute" ° and the New
Mexico Supreme Court. Each body was faced with two primary con42. In McGaw and Thomas v. Frost.
43. Reed v. Melnick, 81 N.M. 608, 609, 471 P.2d 178, 179 (1970).
44. Known generally as latent libel, or sometimes as ibel per quod.
45. Hereinafter cited as § 569 amended. See 43 ALl Proceedings 460 (1966).
46. 81 N.M. 608,610,471 P.2d 178, 180 (1970).
47. Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp., 15 Wis. 2d 452, 113 N.W.2d 135 (1962).
48. See notes 103 to 107 infra, and accompanying text.
49. 81 N.M. 608, 612,471 P.2d 178, 182 (1970).
50. ALl Proceedings, supra note 45, at 431-60, contains various arguments, pro and con
concerning the adoption of § 569 amended.
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cems: (1) the duty to protect the private citizen from defamation,
both deliberate and unintentional; and (2) the wish to protect
innocent parties who, because of a trivial mistake or an unexpected
extrinsic fact, find themselves defendants in libel suits, potentially
liable for a large sum of money.
The American Law Institute recognized those concerns in their
discussion on the Tentative Draft No. 12 of Torts Restatement,
Second, in 1966.' 1 Espousing retention of § 569, Restatement of
Torts," 2 was Mr. Laurence H. Eldredge." 3 Dean William L. Prosser 4
advocated the ratification of the proposed § 569 of the Restatement
of Torts, Second." s After lengthy debate," 6 Dean John W. Wade of
Vanderbuilt introduced' ' a proposal" a taking middle ground be51. See ALI Proceedings, id.
52. Restatement of Torts § 569, at 165 (1938):
One who falsely, and without a privilege to do so, publishes matter defamatory to another in such a manner as to make the publication a libel, is liable to
the other although no special harm or loss of reputation results therefrom.
53. Mr. Eldredge is a member of the Pennsylvania Bar Association; former chairman of
the Board of Governors, Philadelphia Bar Association; and Advisor and former Revising
Reporter for Torts for the American Law Institute.
54. Dean Prosser was the Present Reporter for Torts for the American Law Institute.
55. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 569 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965):
(1) One who publishes defamatory matter is subject to liability without proof
of special harm or loss of reputation if the defamation is
(a) Libel whose defamatory innuendo is apparent from the publication
itself without reference to extrinsic facts by way of inducement, or
(b) Libel or slander which imputes to another
(i) A criminal offense ...
(ii) A loathsome disease...
(iii) Matter incompatible with his business, trade, profession or
office ...
(iv) Unchastity on the part of a woman...
(2) One who publishes any other defamation is subject to liability only upon
proof of special harm...
56. See Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 733 (1966),
and Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1629 (1966), for previews of this
debate.
57. Stating:
I think both Mr. Prosser and Mr. Eldredge will agree that his rule can create
injustice. The rules of the old Restatement, which Mr. Eldredge wants us to
keep, would mean that a man who is completely innocent, who does not know
anything about extrinsic facts that happen to exist, will be held liable strictly
and without any need of proving any actual damage. On the other hand, the
rule that Mr. Prosser is promoting takes just the opposite position and allows a
man who does intend to defame and who knows what he is about, to arrange
it in such fashion that he makes the defamatory statement not defamatory on
its face, but people who know about the circumstances can understand the
defamatory situation.
ALl Proceedings, supra note 45, at 447.
58. This proposal recommended retention of § 569 of the Restatement of Torts (1938),
but adding at the end: "unless he knew or should have known the extrinsic facts necessary
to make the publication actionable."
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tween the rules advocated by Mr. Eldredge and Dean Prosser. That
proposal was adopted by the A. L. I. and subsequently by the New
Mexico Supreme Court in Reed v. Melnick.I 9
As stated by Dean Wade, 6 the position argued by Mr. Eldredge
seemed to emphasize the first concern-that of protecting 6 ' the
citizen from both patent and latent defamation, even if no special
damages could be proven. Dean Prosser's proposal would act to
protect the individual from: (1) all patent defamation; and (2) latent
defamation if special damages could be proven or if the latent
defamation fell into one or more arbitrary 6 2 categories. Dean Wade's
proposal acts to protect the citizen from patent defamation, but in
situations involving latent defamation, acts to protect the individual
citizen only if special damages can be proven, or if the defamer knew
or should have known of the certain facts extrinsic to the publication.
The desire to protect the innocent defamer who publishes matter
non-defamatory on its face was of paramount importance in the
adoption of the amended § 569 of the Restatement of Torts by both
the A. L. I. and the Supreme Court of New Mexico. Traditionally,
however, the law of libel6 ' has taken a "publish at your peril"
approach 6 4 to defamers, enforcing strict liability regardless of intention 661 or negligence. 66
The American Law Institute explained its divergence from the
traditional rules by arguing that they were simply reflecting what the
courts of the land were holding but not saying.6 7 In Reed, the New
Mexico Supreme Court stated:
The press in this state should have the same protection from its
innocent mistakes as that afforded the visual and sound broadcasters
who are held free of liability for theirs "unless it shall be alleged and
proved by the complaining party that such owner, licensee, operator
59. 81 N.M. 608, 471 P.2d 178, 180 (1970).
60. See note 57 supra.
61. At this point, we may ask ourselves, how can you "protect" one who has already
been defamed? The answer is that defamation is primarily injurious to the reputation, and in
many instances the only way a tainted or ruined reputation may be cleared is through the
successful maintenance of a slander or libel action. Thus, one may "protect" his reputation
by vindicating it in court.
62. The same categories enumerated by the common law courts during the sixteenth
century as applicable to slander per se. See notes 7 and 8 supra, and accompanying text.
63. See Henn, supra note 11, for a review of judicial treatment of non-fault liability in
defamation.
64. Id. at 46 n.148.
65. Prosser, supra note 6, at 791.
66. Id.
67. See ALl Proceedings, supra note 45, at 448.
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or such agent or employee has failed to exercise due care to prevent
the publication or utterance of such statement in such broadcast." '6 8

From that statement, we are led to believe that the legislature has
seen fit to protect from liability, broadcasting personnel who
innocently or non-negligently transmit defamatory material.
By examining N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-27-35 (Repl. 1964) in its
entirety, 6 9 however, we find that owners, agents and operators of
such broadcasting stations are exempted from liability only when the
defamatory statements are uttered by one other than the owner,
agent or operator of such station. The protection extended by the
legislature does not protect such persons from liability stemming
from their own statements, no matter how innocent, well-meaning or
careful those persons may be. Likewise, the statute does not purport
to exempt from liability a manager of a broadcasting station whose
announcer-agent has innocently broadcast a defamatory statement.
The desire to protect the innocent defamer who publishes matter
non-defamatory on its face is also reflected in several arguments7 0
voiced against the common law rule: (1) Adoption of the common
law rule might result in a plaintiff being awarded excessive damages
for a trivial complaint; (2) the courts might be deluged by a rash of
petty spite suits which would overcrowd already crowded dockets;
(3) that adoption of the common law rule might expose the press to
unscrupulous use of the threat of libel actions as a form of extortion; 7' and (4) freedom of the press and the right of fair comment
might be adversely affected by the adoption of the common law
rule. 7 2

68. 81 N.M. 608, 610, 471 P.2d 178, 180, quoting N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-27-35 (Repl.
1964).
69. Defamation by radio and television-Liability of owner, licensee or operatorCompliance with federal law.-The owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound radio
broadcasting station or network of stations, and the agents or employees of any such owner,
licensee or operator, shall not be liable for any damages for any defamatory statement
published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound radio broadcast, by one other than
such owner, licensee or operator, or agent or employee thereof, unless it shall be alleged and
proved by the complaining party, that such owner, licensee, operator or such agent or
employee, has failed to exercise due care to prevent the publication or utterance of such
statement in such broadcast. Provided, however, the exercise of due care shall be construed
to include a bona fide compliance with any federal law, or the regulation of any federal
regulatory agency, including those laws and regulations fixing the rates that may be charged
for use of such facilities for visual or sound broadcasts.
70. See Prosser, supra note 6, at 783-85. See also Thayer, Legal Control of the Press 211
(4th ed. 1962), and Chaffee, Government and Mass Communications 104 (1947).
71. See Stewart, Trial Strategy 22-3 (1940).
72. See Berney, Libel and the FirstAmendment-A New ConstitutionalPrivilege, 51 Va.
L. Rev. 1 (1965); Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 Colum. L. Rev.
875 (1949); and Bertelsman, The First Amendment and Protection of Reputation and
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It does appear that argument (1) is sometimes well taken. If the
"deep pocket" theory of damages is accepted, the likelihood of
abuse7 is great if a large and wealthy publisher were sued. Respon-

sible authority,7 4 however, indicates that if it is felt that a plaintiff
might be unjustly enriched by awarding him excessive damages, a
remittitur would be in order, rather than a dismissal.7" Often, a
plaintiff files suit with at least the ulterior objective of repairing his
injured reputation. By allowing a remittitur of excessive awards of
damages, a mitigation of damages for retraction, 7 6 and by allowing

at least nominal damages to be awarded, a court could serve both the
interest of fair play to the innocent defendant 7 7 and the desire of

the plaintiff to redeem his lost reputation. 7 8 Another possible solu-

tion to this problem would be for the court to enter a declaratory
judgement vindicating the reputation of one defamed falsely, though

in good faith, on a "matter of public concern." 7 9 A court might

even require a defending publisher to publish the judgment of the

court vindicating the plaintiff and enforce its order with the sanction
of contempt."
That an adoption of the common law rule concerning libel would

result in a deluge of petty spite suits may be refuted by an examination of jurisdictions which abide by the common law rule. There has
Privacy-New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and How It Grew, 56 Ken. L.J. 718, for comprehensive discussions of the right (or privilege) of fair comment.
73. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), for example, the Alabama
courts inflicted damages of half a million dollars on a locally unpopular Northern newspaper.
74. See Newell On Libel and Slander § 723 (4th ed. 1924). See also Reed v. Melnick, 81
N.M. 608, 610, 471 P.2d 178, 180 (1970), where the court stated: "If prejudiced juries are
prone to award large verdicts against publishers, the better rule would correct this by proper
instruction or the remittitur of excessive judgements, rather than depriving the injured
person of his cause of action."
75. Provisions for the alteration of judgements are found in N.M.R. Civ. P. 59(a) and (e)
[N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(59)(a) and (e) (Supp. 1969)].
76. Many states have enacted statutes providing for the mitigation of general damages if
the defendant publicly retracts his defamatory statement upon demand of the plaintiff. See
for example Ore. Rev. Stat. § 30.160 (1967), and Cal. Civ. Code § 48(a) (West 1954).
77. For the defendant would then not be exposed to excessive verdicts.
78. Nominal damages might help the defendant defray legal expenses. See Newell, supra
note 74, § 723.
79. Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 Cornell L.Q. 581, 604. In Note, An Alternative to the General-DamageAward for
Defamation, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 504, 530-36 (1968), a statute is proposed which would
provide for the mandatory publication of a retraction notice by the offending publisher, or
for free publication of a reply from the defamed individual. This solution would also tend to
serve the interest of fair play to the publisher and the plaintiff's interest in vindicating his
reputation. This proposal, however, makes no provision for the compensation of the plaintiff's pecuniary losses which may well have occurred during the interim between the original
publication of the defamation and the publication of the retraction or reply.
80. This is the practice in several foreign countries. See Pedrick, Id. 604 n.778.
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been no indication of this problem in England or in the several
states8 1 which have adopted the common law rule. Likewise in
Washington 8 2 and Louisiana8 3 no proof of special damages in libel
or slander actions is required. Even Prosser agrees that this objection
cannot be substantiated by an examination of jurisdictions which
have adopted the common law rule. 8 4
The fear that extortion of the press results from liberal application
8
of the common law rule of libel is noted by several authorities. 5
Even though assessment of court costs to unsuccessful plaintiffs,8 6
ethical standards of the legal profession, 8 ' and general reluctance of
the bar to prosecute libel actions 8 8 all operate to discourage such
threats of extortion, the fact that the cost of the defense in a libel
action can be prohibitive, tends to sustain such threats. 89 If large
publishers, however, do tend to resist such threats of extortion and
prefer to "no longer settle out of court, but fight," 9 0 the abuse of
extortion may be negated to some extent. Prosser suggests that the
publishers could be better protected by adoption of the requirement
of proof of actual damages as essential to the existence of any cause
of action involving libel.9 1 He then dismisses that alternative, "because it is clear that proof of actual damage will be impossible in a
great many cases where, from the character of the defamatory words
and the circumstances of that publication, it is all but certain that
9
serious harm has resulted in fact." 2
The contention that substantial damage might be done to our
traditional right of freedom of the press by making publishers pay
damages without proof of injuries has been raised by certain authorities.9 3 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,9 4 the court stated: "[a]

81. Mr. Eldredge lists the states of Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin as following the common law rule as
embodied in Restatement of Torts § 569 (1938). Eldredge, supra note 56, 747-48.
82. See Fitzgerald v. Hopkins, 70 Wash. 2d 924,425 P.2d 920 (1967).
83. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315 (West 1952), and Upton v. Times-Democrat Pub.
Co., 104 La. 141, 28 So. 970 (1900).
84. Prosser, supra note 6, at 782-85.
85. See Stewart, supra note 71, at 22-23, and Hayes, Book Review, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 881,
883-84 (1945).
86. Berney, supra note 72, 34 n. 175.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. In one example cited, the Chicago Tribune's defense cost was $303,968.72 for a
suit in which it "suffered" a verdict of six cents.
90. Id. See also Chaffee, supra note 70, at 104.
91. Prosser, supra note 6, at 783.
92. Id.
93. See for example Prosser, supra note 56, at 1647.
94. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth
of all his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgements
virtually unlimited in amount ' 9 5 is equivalent to censorship. Certainly we must consider the desirability of free and open discussion
96
of every matter of public concern or general interest. On the other
hand, however, we must reconcile the interest of free and open discussion with the individual citizen's interest in reputation and
privacy. This "balancing of interests" 9 7 has of late, been achieved by
the legal evolution of certain limitations which reduce the strict
liability for defamation. 9 ' Those limitations come in various forms:
truth, privileges, rights of fair comment, etc.-all serve the interest of
protecting the publisher, while providing the public with newsworthy
information. Criticism of public officers and organizations, as well as
subjects of scientific, artistic, literary and domestic interest is now
0
suggests
privileged 9 as "fair comment.""'0 0 Professor Berney'
not
should
and
that the protection now given publishers is adequate,
to
reason
no
is
there
be extended past matters of public concern-i.e.
indithe
of
interest
prefer the interest in free expression over the
vidual citizen in "self esteem, privacy or reputation."' 02 If this view
is followed, the more narrow defense of privilege is to be preferred
over a rule which might leave a private citizen no legal remedy to
defend his reputation.
VI
THE INNOCENT MEANING RULE
In addition to adopting the amended § 569 of the Restatement of
Torts, the New Mexico Supreme Court quoted a portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Martin v. Outboard
Marine Corp.:
95. Id. at 279.
96. See Berney, supra note 72, at 39-48, and Nutting, Is the FirstAmendment Obsolete?,
30 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 167-73 (1961).
97. See Berney, id.
98. See Spiegal, Defamation by Implication-In the Confidential Manner, 29 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 306, 317 (1956).
99. Restatement of Torts § 607-09 (1938), and Spiegal, id., at 320. See generally
Berney, supra note 72; Noel, supra note 72; Bertelsman, supra note 72; and Pedrick, supra
note 79.
100. Fair comment has been described as "[in] ere expressions of opinion or severe
criticism..." going "only to the merits or demerits of a condition, cause or controversy
which is under public scrutiny..." Howard v. Southern Calif. Associated Newspapers, 95
Cal. App. 2d 580, 584, 213 P.2d 399, 403 (1950). See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
however, where the court extended this privilege, holding a public official could not recover
damages resulting from publication unless actual malice, or a reckless disregard for the truth
is shown.
101. Berney, supra note 72, at 45-47.

102. Id., at 45.
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If the publication is capable of a defamatory meaning and in the
form of libel, it is actionable without an allegation of special
damages; if in the form of slander not constituting one of the four
arbitrary categories, it is not actionable without an allegation of
special damages. After proof is in, the court may decide the communication is subject to one or more meanings, one being
defamatory and the other innocent, or all defamatory. If the only
possible meaning or meanings of the communication under all the
facts in the case are defamatory as applied to the plaintiff and could
only be reasonably so understood by the recipient, the court may
hold the language defamatory as a matter of law and there is no
question to go to the jury. If the court determines the communication is capable of an innocent meaning as well as a defamatory
meaning, it is then for the jury to determine whether the communication capable of a defamatory meaning was so understood by its
recipient. It is misleading to state on demurer that the alleged libel,
whether on its face or by reason of extrinsic circumstances is
libelous per se when all that is then decided 0is3 that the alleged
publication is capable of a defamatory meaning.
Immediately following that quotation, the New Mexico Court
stated:
We agree with the Wisconsin court. We reaffirm the innocent meaning rule as first set forth in Dillard v. Shattuck, supra, as applicable
to both libel and slander. There, we said a defamatory character will
not be given the words "unless this is their plain and obvious import," and that language will "receive an innocent interpretation
where fairly susceptable to it."' 04
Here, the court purports to "agree" with the Wisconsin statement
which holds all libel actionable without proof of special damages.
The Wisonsin rule also provides that the judge may rule on whether
the communication was capable of conveying a defamatory meaning.' o If the judge finds that the communication was incapable of
any defamatory interpretation, the action will be dismissed.' 06 If
the alleged communication is capable of both a defamatory and nondefamatory meaning, a jury question is presented' 0 as to whether
such communication was in fact interpreted in its defamatory sense
103. Reed v. Melnick, 81 N.M. 608 at 612, 471 P.2d 178 at 182 (1970), quoting Martin
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 15 Wisc. 2d 452, 457, 113 N.W. 2d 135, 140 (1962).
104. 81 N.M. 608, 612, 471 P.2d 178, 182 (1970).
105. See Wozniak v. Local 1111 of the United Electrical Workers of America, 45 Wis.
2d 588, 592, 173 N.W.2d 596, 598 (1970) and Frinzi v. Hanson, 30 Wis. 2d 271, 276, 140
N.W.2d 259, 261 (1966).
106. Id.
107. As a question of fact. The jury is allowed to take into account:
(1) "the circumstances"; (2) the "context" of the publication; and (3) the
"recipients" to decide if the publication was actually interpreted in its
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by a recipient. If the jury finds that no one did so understand the
communication in its defamatory sense, no action may be sustained,
for the plaintiff could not be damaged.
After "agreeing" with the Wisconsin statement, the court in Reed
reaffirmed the New Mexico innocent meaning rule, which, as stated
in Dillardv. Shattuck" 08 "is but another way of saying that, where a
per se slanderous" 9 character is sought to be impressed upon the
claimed defamatory words, they will not be given such meaning
unless that is their plain and obvious import." Under the Dillard rule,
if a publication is capable of both a defamatory and a non-defamatory interpretation, it "will receive an innocent interpretation," and
cannot be treated as libel per se.' 1
The reaffirmation of the innocent meaning rule as stated in Dillard
is inconsistent with the Wisconsin rule. Under the Wisconsin rule, if a
statement is subject to various defamatory and non-defamatory interpretations, the jury would decide if the statement was in fact understood in its defamatory sense. Under the Dillard rule, a communication containing a defamatory innuendo which was not its plain
and obvious import, but which was in fact understood in its libelous
connotation, would not be considered actionable without proof of
.special damages. Perhaps the New Mexico decision reflects the feeling
that if the defamatory connotation of an utterance is not its "plain
and obvious import," the publisher could not and should not have
known of the extrinsic facts needed to make the statement defamatory in its innuendo. However, the Dillard rule was not limited in
Reed to communications requiring extrinsic facts to prove the
defamatory character of the writing.
By reaffirming the "innocent meaning rule as first set out in
Dillard," does the New Mexico Supreme Court intend to continue
the per se-per quod distinction as outlined in Dillard, Del Rico,
Thomas and McGaw?' 1 1 Hopefully not, for the reaffirmation of the
per se-per quod distinction of the innocent meaning rule would serve
to negate the desired reform sought by the adoption of the amended
§ 569 of the Restatement of Torts. Also, the reaffirmation of the
Dillard rule conflicts with the well-written decision of the Wisconsin
Court in Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp. which was quoted in
Reed.
defamatory sense. Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp., 15 Wis. 2d 452, 457, 113
N.W.2d 135,140-141 (1962).
108. 36 N.M. 202, 206, 11 P.2d 543 at 546 (1932).
109. Or libelous, for in Reed, the court holds Dillard's rule as applicable to both slander
and libel.
110. 36 N.M. 202, 206, 11 P.2d 543, 546 (1932).
111. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.

July 1971]

TORTS-LIBEL IN NEW MEXICO

VII
CONCLUSION
The adoption of the amended § 569 of the Restatement of Torts
provided a significant attempt to reform the harsh and complex libel
laws of New Mexico. However, the extent of the reform was not as
great as could have been effectuated by a return to the common law
rules of libel as outlined in Restatement of Torts § 569 (1938).
In certain instances, it is still possible for a citizen to be defamed
in New Mexico and be prevented from seeking legal means to clear
his name-simply because he cannot place a specific money value on
the loss of his reputation. The court in Reed' 1'2 agreed that the
relationship between the damage to one's reputation and his
pecuniary loss is tenuous at best, but the court still requires proof of
special damages in order to protect the "innocent" defamer. When
measuring fault, however, can the publisher ever be as innocent as
the hapless person he has defamed?
The reaffirmation of the innocent meaning rule serves to limit
much of the reform effectuated by the adoption of the amended
§ 569 of the Restatement of Torts. The reaffirmation of the
innocent meaning rule also tends to perpetuate the confusion which
has been inherent in the decisions reflecting New Mexico's rules of
libel for several decades. For these reasons, the New Mexico Supreme
Court is urged to make a fresh appraisal of the application of the
innocent meaning rule to the amended § 569 of the Restatement of
Torts.
RANDOLPH B. FELKER

112. Asking: "what is the money value of one's reputation, even when related to a
business or profession?"; and stating: "It may be that we are requiring the plaintiff to
'measure the unmeasurable'." 81 N.M. 608, 610, 471 P.2d 170, 180 (1970), quoting Comment, supra note 16, at 604.

